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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
A

PROFESSOR'S ANNUAL FRUSTRATION

It is not easy to comment on conflict of laws decisions. The
problem is not that the decisions of Louisiana appellate courts are
worse than those of other American courts. Usually they are not. The
difficulty lies in a lack of consensus-indeed, a lack of understanding-on the national level as to the nature and foundation of the
conflict of laws. It is impossible to give an adequate critique of any
one or of a few decisions without writing a treatise in which the proper
foundations of the conflict of laws and the errors often espoused are
discussed and the opinions appraised against the exposition. Hints of
better things are all that can be given in a Symposium of this kind,
and the very realization of the unavoidable inadequacy of those hints
leads to the writer's annual frustration. But comment one must.
INTERSTATE DOMICILE OF WIFE

Tjadem v. Tademl correctly notes that since Williams v. North
Carolina (I)' a married woman has ability to acquire an interstate
domicile of choice without having been given cause by her husband
to live separately from him. It is an important part of the Williams
decision which frequently has gone unnoticed. The decision in
Tjadem, moreover, does give a very clear account of the requirements
for acquiring a domicile of choice, but the writer finds it difficult to
agree with the court's application of those requirements to the facts
of the case.
ALIMONY

In re Williams3 was a curator's suit to obtain alimony for an
interdicted divorced wife. She and her husband presumably had been
domiciled in Louisiana in 1948 when she obtained a separation from
bed and board on the ground of the husband's cruelty. Ten years later
the husband obtained a divorce in Mississippi on the ground of the
wife's abandonment. In 1971 Mrs. Williams was interdicted and her
curator sued the husband, apparently then domiciled in Louisiana,
for alimony. The husband contended that the Mississippi court's
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 294 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
3. 288 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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finding that the wife had been at fault rendered her ineligible for
alimony under Civil Code article 160.1 Mrs. Williams' curatrix contended the fault issue was been resolved in favor of Mrs. Williams in
the 1948 Louisiana separation suit.5 The court awarded alimony to
Mrs. Williams, but based its judgment on the fact that under Mississippi law even a wife at fault in a divorce may be awarded alimony.
It is submitted that the result reached by the court was correct,
but not for the reason given. If the divorced husband and wife were
both domiciled in Louisiana at the time of the suit for alimony, then
the wife's entitlement and the husband's obligation should have been
measured by Louisiana law alone. The obligation to demand alimony
should be limited to the right granted the plaintiff by his or her
state's law at the time of the demand-the law of the society in which
he or she has chosen to live and presently applicable to him or her.
In like fashion the alimentary obligation of the defendant should be
limited by his or her state's law at the time of demand. No one, in
other words, should be entitled to demand more alimony than his
state's law would permit, or the defendant's state's law would require, whichever is less. The writer believes this formula is a logical
extension of the 1933 United States Supreme Court decision in
Yarborough v. Yarborough.' It also conforms in part to the principle
sanctioned by the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
under which the defendant owes alimony according to the law of his
domicile, rather than that of the plaintiffs domicile, at the time of
suit.7 Neither party in the Williams case having been domiciled in
Mississippi at the time of suit, resort should not have been made to
the law of that state.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND DELICT

Griffin v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.' was reported
4. If the Mississippi divorce was ex parte, the finding of fault therein was irrelevant. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
5. The argument was based on Richardsonv. Richardson,275 So. 2d 845 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973), now approved of by the Louisiana supreme court in Fulmer v. Fulmer,
No. 54,510 (Oct. 11, 1974).

6. 290 U.S. 202 (1933). A child domiciled in South Carolina sued her father,
domiciled in Georgia, for alimony due under South Carolina law, but not under Georgia law. The court decided for the father, finding him without obligation inasmuch as
Georgia law imposed none on him.
7. LA. R.S. 13:1661 (1950) as amended by La. Acts 1966, No. 228, §1. See also the
writer's remarks in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Conflict of Laws, 32 LA. L. REv. 295, 297 (1972); R. PASCAL, FAmILY LAW COURSE
§20.4 (1973).
8. 283 So. 2d 748 (La. 1973).
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early enough in 1973 to be considered briefly in last year's
Symposium.I There a Texas employee of a Texas employer had been
injured in Louisiana in the course of his employment and had received a final award under the Texas workmen's compensation law.
He was allowed, nevertheless, to recover under the Louisiana
workmen's compensation law amounts over and above those recovered under the Texas statute. The rationale of the decision was
based on Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,11decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1947, which declared that
both the state of employment and the state of injury could apply their
laws to the case and that neither state could prevent the other state
from applying its laws to it. The writer commented then that he
doubted that two states could be said to have simultaneous legislative jurisdiction on any one issue in the same case at the same time."
That critique is reaffirmed here. That either Texas law or Louisiana
law might be considered applicable to a case, depending on particular
circumstances, is comprehensible. But that both might be applicable
on the same issue at the same time is not.
This leads to the discussion of a related problem pronounced
upon last year. In Wayne v. Olinkraft, Inc.,12 a Louisiana employee
of a Louisiana employer received injuries in Arkansas and died as a
result of the alleged negligence of a Louisiana domiciliary doing business in Arkansas as well as in Louisiana and under contract to perform certain operations for the Louisiana employer. Both the employer and the contractor were covered by the same workmen's compensation insurance policy. Under Arkansas law, however, or so it
was alleged, the contractor would not have been liable to the employee for workmen's compensation benefits. The deceased employee's widow recovered under the Louisiana workmen's compensation law and then sued the contractor for wrongful death under Arkansas law. The court denied recovery in accordance with
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§183 and 184. Under §183
Louisiana's application of Arkansas law to allow the widow recovery
is declared permissible under the United States Constitution, but
under §184 it is recommended that Louisiana not allow recovery for
delict if the plaintiff has recovered or may recover under a workmen's
compensation law which is made an exclusive remedy in Louisiana.
9. The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Conflict
of Laws, 34 LA. L. REV. 322 (1974).

10. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
11. The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1972-1973 Term-Conflict
of Laws, 34 LA. L. REV. 322, 323 (1974).
12. 293 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
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The writer can agree fully with the result reached in Wayne. It
is quite difficult to understand why anyone should be considered
entitled to recover under the law of another state what he would be
denied under the plan of order his own state has enacted out of
concern for the common good. It is for the same reason that the writer
cannot agree with the result in Griffin. In principle the two decisions
are inconsistent. On the other hand, the writer cannot agree with
Wayne's Restatement foundations. The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws envisions the conflict of laws as a branch of state law
under which the state determines for itself - subject to minimal
control on the basis of full faith and credit, due process, and other
constitutional "limitations" - the occasions and extent of its own
legislative and judicial competences. The principle is stated in §2;
§183 is merely a further specification of this principle for the particular issue. For the writer, the basis of the conflict of laws rules among
the states of the Union - the delineation of their legislative and
judicial jurisdictions - is by its very nature suprastate in character
and, by the full faith and credit clause, a matter subject to federal
determination. Thus neither Louisiana nor any other state is free to
apply or not apply another state's law. It is obliged to apply the law
of that state which the federal authority - the Congress or, in its
default, the Supreme Court, judges reasonably or presumably would
judge reasonably to have legislative jurisdiction. 3 The Restatement's
position, it is true, follows Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.,' 4 but that decision simply cannot be justified in the light of the
necessary implications of the full faith and credit clause. 5
"PARTY CHOICE OF LAW"

Two decisions involved questions of permissible "party choice of
law." In Davis v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,'" the court, on rehearing, applied New York law to find an employee obliged to accept a
decision by a company committee on the employee's eligibility for a
benefit under an employee benefit plan. The plan's organic document
provided for such a committee determination, the provision was valid
by New York law, and the employee was deemed to have accepted
the applicability of New York law to the plan in electing to avail
13. See the writer's comments in the Symposia of preceding years: The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts-Conflictof Laws, 34 LA. L. REv. 319, 320(1974) (197273 Term); 33 LA. L. REV. 276, 278 (1973) (1971-72 Term); 32 LA. L. REV. 295, 296-97
(1972) (1970-71 Term); 31 LA. L. REV. 312, 314 (1971) (1969-70 Term).

14. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
15. See the references in note 13 supra.
16. 283 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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himself of the plan itself. The rationale of the decision was that the
plan applied to employees in many states and the applicability of one
state's law rather than many was justifiable in the interest of certainty, uniformity, and economy. Accordingly the court rejected the
contention that the plan itself was a contract of adhesion and that
the plaintiff should have the right to have his eligibility for benefits
determined in proceedings permissible under the law of Louisiana,
the state of his domicile in which he was employed and in which the
defendant did business. The second decision, that in United States
Leasing Corp. v. Keiler, 71 refused to recognize as binding on the lessee
of a business machine methods of enforcement spelled out in the
contract and valid by California law, though not by Louisiana law,
simply because the contract provided that California law should
apply. Here the court reasoned that the obligations of the contract
were to be performed in Louisiana and any agreement on the enforcement of those obligations must be of a kind that is permissible under
Louisiana law.
The Keiler decision is correct. Parties to an agreement cannot be
said, logically, to have the right to "choose the law" applicable to
their agreement. Legislation is not a private function. Private persons
may be allowed to contract any scheme of order between them which
is not forbidden by the law of the state with legislative jurisdiction
in the matter. They may, arguably, describe their agreement by reference to the provisions of the laws of another jurisdiction. In so doing,
however, they are not choosing a law, but simply describing their
agreed upon rights and obligations by reference to the rules of another
legal system. The consideration just mentioned causes doubt to be
shed on the rationaleused in Humble, even though the Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws would consider it acceptable. 8 Whereas,
assuming a true contractual situation, the parties' agreement to accept the applicability of New York law might be construed to be a
reference to New York law for convenience in specifying their rights
and obligations, it would be impossible to accept a provision of New
York law contrary to any Louisiana law considered imperative or
mandatory in the interest of good order. It is suggested that under
Louisiana law a person employed in Louisiana is entitled, as a matter
of public order, to a judicial determination of his rights against an
employer domiciled or doing business in Louisiana unless he has
agreed to a form of arbitration recognized by Louisiana law. The
reasoning used in Humble, moreover, long has been rejected in insurance controversies and it is suggested that the analogy is clear.
17. 290 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
18. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFUCT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1970).
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INAPPROPRIATENESS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CONFLICTS CASES

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal declared, in Hobbs v. Firemen's Fund American Insurance Co.,"9 that it was inappropriate to
grant a summary judgment in a case involving conflict of laws issues,
even if those issues are not mentioned by counsel. The writer judges
this to be a wise decision which should be followed in all but those
rare instances in which there can be no reasonable difference of opinion on the conflicts issue. The court is obliged to apply the proper law
and, considering the present state of the subject, it may with good
reason require that there be argument on almost any conflicts issue.
THE LONG HORN OF TEXAS LAW
Long arm statutes seem to vie with each other for reach. Texas
apparently decided that a long horn statute could gore more easily
than a long arm could reach and so enacted one. In what the writer
considers a very poorly reasoned majority opinion the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal, in Dodson v. Fontenot,1" upheld the application of
the Texas statute to a Louisiana individual whose only contacts with
Texas were in connection with one purchase of horses at a Texas
auction and their shipment to his Louisiana farm. There is no doubt
the Texas statute asserts Texas judicial jurisdiction under the circumstances. It deems "entering into a contract by mail or otherwise
with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this State" to be a sufficient basis for the asserted jurisdiction. The plaintiff had sued in Texas using the statute in the effort
to obtain personal jurisdiction against the defendant and had recovered a judgment against him. The majority opinion gave full faith
and credit to the judgment reasoning (1) that "Texas courts could
find the present judgment valid"'" and (2) that under 28 U.S.C. §1738
and the full faith and credit clause Louisiana is "required to give the
Texas judgment the same full faith and credit in Louisiana as that
judgment would receive in Texas."22 Judge Culpepper wrote an able
dissent which, unfortunately, was limited to showing that the "doing
business" basis of long arm statutes has not ever been deemed to
include a "single act of purchase" in a jurisdiction.
Again, adequate comment on this decision would require a volume. A summary must suffice here. Judge Culpepper's dissent, so far
as it goes, is correct. But the bases of full faith and credit as the writer
19.
20.
21.
22.

293 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
285 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 330.
Id.
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understands them to be stated in the majority opinion simply cannot
be accepted as correct. The majority opinion seems to say that if
Texas decides its assertion of jurisdiction is lawful then Louisiana
must honor that assertion. If so, then the full faith and credit clause
and 28 U.S.C. §1738 require each state to give in to every other state's
assertion of jurisdiction. What the full faith and credit clause does
mean is that every state must recognize the laws and judgments of
other states when enacted or made with interstate legislative or judicial jurisdiction. The full faith and credit clause comes into play only
when the statute is to be applied because of the legislative jurisdiction of the enacting state or when a judgment is to be enforced because of the judicial jurisdiction of the rendering state. The full faith
and credit clause, in other words, is not to be applied unless and until
the jurisdiction of the enacting or rendering state is established,
though a presumption of jurisdiction may shift the burden of proof
in judicial jurisdiction cases. It may be that 28 U.S.C. §1738 is not a
too well-worded statute,2" but it cannot be understood to have the
effect of giving each state the right to determine its own interstate
legislative and judicial competences without contradicting the very
basis of the full faith and credit clause. That clause assumes that
each state has its proper spheres of legislative and judicial jurisdiction based on criteria not determinable by the mere wills of the individual states themselves, but rather through reasonable judgments
on the fitness of one state rather than another exercising legislative
or judicial power over the particular kind of situation. 4
23. 28 U.S.C. §1738, para. 3 (1948): "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings
[of each State, Territory or Possession of the United States] or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
24. See the writer's remarks in previous Symposia, cited in note 13 supra, but
particularly 32 LA. L. REv. 296 (1972); 31 LA. L. REv. 314 (1971).

